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I. INTRODUCTION

“I was thinking about your plans for a law review article on the
1
San Francisco case. There may be [sic] some ethical issues . . . .
You should review Rules of Professional Responsibility 1.6 and
† J.D., William Mitchell College of Law, 2002.
1. The San Francisco case referred to is State v. Old Republic Title Co., Inc.,
No. 993570 (San Francisco County Court Nov. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Old Republic
Title]. Old Republic Title dealt with the issue of whether or not a title insurance
company could legally retain, as additional profits, the interest earned in its
escrow accounts from property closings it handled for its customers. Telephone
Interview with Holly Ness, Research Attorney for Judge Pollock, San Francisco
County Court (Oct. 29, 2001). The California District Court for the District of San
Francisco found that Old Republic Title misappropriated approximately $14
million dollars from its customers. Id.
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3

This paper is a response to an attack on academic freedom
4
and academic speech. The paper reports the author’s encounter
with a party’s intent to silence rather than permit healthy debate of
5
a legal issue, by attempting to censor and suppress a proposed
6
7
topic for a law review paper.
The letter proposing silence
contains three related arguments for censoring the proposed topic
based on the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, and an
additional argument based on the confidentiality portion of an
8
employee handbook. The strongest argument made was that
writing a paper on a particular legal issue would violate the
obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of the former
9
client. The second Model Rules-based contention for censorship
of the proposed topic was that the information to be discussed
throughout the paper would be detrimental to the author’s
10
previous employer’s client.
As to the last rationale given, the
confidentiality clause will be shown to have no binding effect on
the author due to the clause’s own language.
This paper has three inter-related purposes. First, it will
2. Letter from Attorney X, Partner, X, Y & Z Law Firm, to Aaron M. Vande
Linde, Staff, Volume 28 William Mitchell Law Review 1 (Aug. 17, 2001)(on file
with author)[hereinafter August 17 Letter]. Please note the author felt it
appropriate to change names so as not to burn any proverbial bridges.
3. “The freedom to teach or to learn without . . . interference.” WEBSTER’S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 48 (1986).
4. Academic speech encompasses both scholarship and teaching in which
the author must persuade on the basis of reason and evidence. J. Peter Byrne,
Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 258
(1989). Byrne goes on to state that “academic speech provides our [society’s]
most important model of expression that is meaningful as well as free, . . . critical
and inspirational . . . much of its value is social - - it contributes profoundly to
society at large.” Id. at 261.
5. See supra note 1.
6. Note that the paper was to fulfill a law review requirement, and only had a
slight chance for publication.
7. “I think it makes more sense for you to consider another topic, than to
risk ethical issues.” August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 2.
8. X, Y & Z Law Firm, Employee Handbook – Confidentiality, (1999)(on file
with author) [hereinafter Confidentiality Clause]. The Confidentiality Clause
states confidential information belongs to the firm and its clients and employees,
as a condition of employment, who must agree not to divulge or disclose any such
confidential information. Id.
9. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1.
10. The vague drafting technique employed in the August 17 Letter, supra
note 2, caused this author to make an assumption that Attorney X was trying to
avoid any future litigation against his client.
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11

introduce the reader to the concept of academic freedom, its
12
origins, and its growth into a constitutionally protected right.
Second, the author will debunk the arguments made in favor of
censorship – that is, if any reputable legal scholar or practitioner
would consider vague references to two particular Rules of
13
Professional Responsibility to be arguments. Lastly, the paper will
demonstrate the interaction between academic freedom and
censorship, and propose a solution to abate a previous employer
while allowing the author to elevate to higher moral ground.
Moreover, by engaging in the type of rigorous debate the author
felt should have been afforded his first topic, the paper will further
14
the author’s tutelage in the legal field.
II. CENSORSHIP AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The American concept of academic freedom came to fruition
by way of the American Association of University Professors’ 1915
15
General Declaration of Principles. The Committee on Academic
Freedom justified for academic freedom on the basis that the “first
condition of progress is complete and unlimited freedom to pursue
16
inquiry and publish its results.”
The scientific method, it was argued, permitted a researcher to
test theory against fact; to have a successful scientific endeavor is to
17
have a free exchange among researchers. The Committee further
believed that “free employment of the scientific method would lead
18
to” discovering the independently existing truths of the world.
11. See supra note 3.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 27-84.
13. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1.
14. See supra note 1.
15. General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure, 1 A.A.U.P. BULL. pt. 1, at 15, 17 (1915), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 860, 874-75 (R. Hofstadter & W. Smith eds.,
Pre-Civil War higher
1961)[hereinafter 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION].
education curriculum was trained young men in religious piety as preparation for
the clergy or for the professions of law and medicine. 1828 Report of Yale Faculty,
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 275 (R.
Hofstadter & W. Smith eds., 1961)[hereinafter 1 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION].
This curriculum consisted mainly of class exercises in the fundamentals of ancient
language, Greek and Latin, and mathematics – arguably scholarly work lacking in
any amount of intellectual strife. F. RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY 245-48 (1962).
16. 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 15, at 867.
17. Byrne, supra note 4, at 275-77.
18. Id. at 277.
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Hence, the Committee renounced the view that academic freedom
was a right held by the individual faculty member by determining
that
the liberty of the scholar within the university to set forth his
conclusions, be they what they may, is conditioned by their being
conclusions gained by a scholar’s method and held in a scholar’s
spirit; that is to say, the fruits of competent and patient and sincere
inquiry, and they should be set forth with dignity, courtesy, and
19
temperateness of language.
Thus, the Committee was not arguing academic speech should
gain general immunity; it was arguing for an extension of
autonomy to academic scholars to propose, research and test new
hypotheses within their respective disciplines. Effectively, this
merely confined a scholar’s work to a specialty without abridging
the scholar’s freedom to strive for new levels of understanding
20
within a discipline. Still, the Committee felt it necessary for each
academic to abide by the strictures of the scientific method.
Constancy of method would produce scientific speech amounting
21
to pure knowledge. In turn, it follows that a scholar deviating
from the scientific method “would forfeit the opportunity to master
22
the truth.”
The concept of academic freedom, whose initial stance was for
the benefit of the individual professor from interference from the
23
institution, was not codified until 1940. The determination of the
American Association of University Professors to do so was based
on general endorsement within every major higher education
24
organization in the nation. Academic freedom, it was thought,
eliminated interference with research and discourse of contentious
issues and embodied the noble vision of the academic calling —
25
the advancement of truth. Consequently, “those who are able to
19. 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 15, at 860.
20. See R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME 6 (1955). To illustrate,
MacIver writes, “[A]cademic freedom is . . . a right claimed by the accredited
educator . . . to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without
being subjected to any interference . . . because the conclusions are unacceptable
to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.” Id.
21. 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 15, at 875.
22. Byrne, supra note 4, at 278.
23. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 64 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 110 (1978), reprinted in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFS., POLICY DOCUMENTS &
REPORTS 3 (1984) [hereinafter AAUP POLICY].
24. Id. at 7-9.
25. Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/9

4

Stanchfield: Voting Lock-ups and Sales of Partially Owned Subsidiaries: Can St
AARON'S PAPER -- FINAL FORMAT

2002

5/23/2002 5:38 PM

CENSORSHIP OF LEGAL ACADEMIC SCHOLARSHIP

105

establish successfully new perspectives in a discipline are likely to
26
become its leaders.”
A. Judicial Development of Academic Freedom
There are two principles that afford legal academic
27
28
scholarship protection under the First Amendment; first, that
29
the speech is political in nature, and second that the origin of the
30
31
speech is academic.
Typically, legal academic scholarship
centers on political speech and deserves extraordinary preservation
32
under the First Amendment. Moreover, legal scholarship is able
to claim enhanced constitutional protection based on the legal
33
community’s commitment to academic freedom. Legal academic
scholarship claims preeminent constitutional protection because of
its unsurpassed contribution to societal debates in general.
Furthermore, legal academic scholarship attempts to provide
society with a careful, self-critical and precise analysis of current
34
legal issues.
Academic freedom was first espoused by Justice Douglas in his

Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1276-77 (1988); L. VEYSEY, THE
EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 311 (1965).
26. Byrne, supra note 4, at 284.
27. This amalgamation of words is an attempt to capture the concept of
knowledge through learning in a legal institution.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
29. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 2724 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., in Part I) (stating that a lawyer’s
political speech which is “critical of the exercise of the State’s power lies at the very
center of the First Amendment”.
30. “Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate . . . otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.” Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Warren, C.J., with Black, Douglas and
Brennan, JJ.).
31. See supra note 27.
32. “The pros and cons of legislative enactments are clearly discussion or
dialogue that is highly honored in our First Amendment traditions.” Pitts. Press
Co. v. Pitts. Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 398 (1973)(Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
33. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978);
Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250;
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-98 (1952)(Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1951).
34. Allan W. Vestal, Former Client Censorship of Academic Scholarship, 43
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1247, 1254 (1992).
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35

dissenting opinion in Adler v. Board of Education. The majority in
36
Adler upheld New York’s Feinberg Law, which was a loyalty test for
37
public school teachers, against a First Amendment challenge by
New York’s public school teachers. The Court’s majority opinion
treated academic freedom as a personal interest to a particular
38
teacher. Arguing that academic freedom is a social interest, and
not personal to the instructor, Justices Douglas and Black looked to
the statute’s educational impact and not merely the effect on an
39
individual teacher. Justice Douglas argued against the noxious
nature of the Feinberg Law when describing the law as a “system of
40
spying and surveillance.” Justices Douglas and Black established
the First Amendment character of academic freedom by stating
[w]here suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for
fear of their jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect. . . .
The teacher is no longer a stimulant to adventurous thinking; she
becomes instead a pipe line for safe and sound information. A
41
deadening dogma takes the place of free inquiry.
Justice Douglas never clearly argued in favor of constitutional
protection for academic freedom; rather, he claimed a situation
42
enveloped in suspicion was inconsistent with academic freedom.
Justice Douglas further asserted that the Feinberg Law would
hinder the classroom process – for Justice Douglas, “academic
freedom denoted an attractive mode of teaching and scholarship
43
rather than a legal right.”
The Court addressed Oklahoma’s teacher loyalty test in
44
Wieman v. Updegraff. This time, however, the Court affirmed the
First Amendment origin of academic freedom and its social
45
importance. Albeit Justice Frankfurter never specifically used the
35. 342 U.S. at 510 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
36. The Adler Court upheld the law on the now-discredited doctrine that
government can condition public employment on compliance with any pertinent
condition. Byrne, supra note 4, at 340 n.147.
37. New York’s statute was designed to preclude the employment of anyone
who belonged to an organization advocating the violent overthrow of the
government. Adler, 342 U.S. at 485.
38. Id. at 492.
39. Id. at 510 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
40. Id. at 510-11.
41. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
42. Id. At the time, academic freedom was understood as the actual process
of free inquiry in the classroom. Byrne, supra note 4, at 290 n.147.
43. Byrne, supra note 4, at 290 n.147.
44. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
45. Id. at 196-98 (Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., concurring).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/9

6

Stanchfield: Voting Lock-ups and Sales of Partially Owned Subsidiaries: Can St
AARON'S PAPER -- FINAL FORMAT

2002

5/23/2002 5:38 PM

CENSORSHIP OF LEGAL ACADEMIC SCHOLARSHIP

107

46

words “academic freedom,” his dynamic writing concerning the
social value of educators’ freedom to teach, research, and report
indicated the Court’s future justifications for academic freedom.
47
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Court reversed the conviction
48
of a Marxist for refusing to answer the State Attorney General’s
questions concerning a lecture given at the University of New
49
Hampshire. The Court based its holding on violations of due
process rather than infringement of an academic’s First
50
Amendment academic freedom rights.
Never again would the
51
Court rely on such an odd doctrine to protect academic freedom
52
rights. However, the plurality opinion approved of constitutional
limits on the government’s power to interfere with academic
freedom, stating “[w]e do not now conceive of any circumstance
wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these
53
fields.”

46. Id.
47. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
48. The Court described Paul Sweezy solely as a journalist. Id. at 245. In fact,
Sweezy was the founder of the left wing magazine Monthly Review. Byrne, supra
note 4, at 289, n.139. Moreover, the Court felt because Sweezy did not occupy a
university level academic position, the A.A.U.P.’s tradition of academic freedom
would not insulate Sweezy. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 245, 254-55.
49. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 245.
50. Id. (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Warren’s opinion held that the New
Hampshire Attorney General’s questioning violated due process in that New
Hampshire’s legislature had made a “broad and ill-defined” delegation to the
Attorney General of the investigative power. Id. at 254-55.
51. It is important to note that the Sweezy decision came down the same day as
other related opinions all of which made it more difficult for legislative bodies to
reveal and punish subversive citizens. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957)
(invalidating the dismissal of an allegedly disloyal State Department employee as
inconsistent with that department’s procedural guidelines); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (reversing a criminal contempt conviction of a witness
who refused to answer the House Un-American Activities Committee’s questions
on the ground that the statutory delegation to the Committee was so vague the
witness was unable to decide which questions the Committee could compel the
witness to answer); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957) (reversing the
convictions of Communist Party members for conspiring to violate the Smith Act
on the ground that the Smith Act only outlawed advocating violent revolution, not
“teaching forcible overthrow as an abstract principle”).
52. Professor Byrne felt the Court’s decision in Sweezy, based on a procedural
limitation rather than a clear, positive right of academic freedom, reflected the
Court’s anxiety about abuses found in the McCarthyism investigations or the
Court’s antipathy to pronounce clear, definitive First Amendment rights. Byrne,
supra note 4, at 289. See also Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 753 (1975).
53. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 251 (plurality opinion).
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Sweezy’s plurality and concurring opinions contain several
peculiarities. To begin with, never before had the Court hinted
54
that the First Amendment protected academic freedom.
Additionally, Justice Frankfurter relied on non-legal sources to
describe the content of the right of academic freedom; arguably,
55
this was due to the lack of precedent in the area. Likewise both
opinions praise academic freedom “by stressing the social utility of
56
Moreover, both opinions argued that
free universities.”
continued progress in the nation’s institutions of higher education
requiring freedom of inquiry and discussion. Without such
freedoms afforded to academia, its progress would be impaired,
which in turn would jeopardize our democratic system of
government. Thus government should not interfere with academic
57
Sweezy vested new constitutional protections in
freedom.
58
academic freedom through the opinion’s “triumphant rhetoric.”
Nonetheless, the Court has restricted academic freedom rights in
59
other limited contexts.
B. Two Challenges to the Concept of Academic Freedom
1. Court Affirmations of Restrictions to Academic Freedom
Regardless of the virtues of legal academic scholarship, the
Supreme Court has affirmed bar regulations circumscribing a legal
scholar’s First Amendment protections in two particular areas:
comments made by practicing attorneys involved in pending
60
litigation, and those regarding the solicitation of commercial

54. Id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
55. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
56. Byrne, supra note 4, at 293.
57. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion); Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J.
concurring).
58. Byrne, supra note 4, at 293.
59. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). The Barenblatt Court
affirmed the conviction of an academic for criminal contempt in refusing to
answer congressional questions concerning communist activities of University of
Michigan graduate students. Id. The Court promised to “always be on the alert
against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally protected domain,” but
emphasized that the university is not a “constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into
matters that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain . . . .” Id
at 112. Thus, Barenblatt can be seen as a major blow to the protection of academic
freedom, established just two years earlier in Sweezy.
60. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1958).
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61

speech.
The Sawyer Court addressed the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of
62
the Hawaiian Supreme Court Order imposing a one-year
63
suspension from practicing law on petitioner. The Hawaiian Bar
charged petitioner with violating the ethical code by making
64
speeches and giving interviews regarding a Smith Act trial.
Rejecting a mechanical test based on the pendency of litigation
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated an approach
proposing that lawyers are free to critique the state of the law, but
limits First Amendment rights where there is an “improper attack
65
on [the] administration of justice.”
Nevertheless, Justice Stewart warned in his concurrence that
“[o]bedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what
in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected
66
speech.”
Even though the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
67
decision, it was clear that the Court foresaw certain situations in
which the attorney should conform to the ethical principles of his
68
or her profession.
Thirty-three years later, the Court would take a narrower view
69
70
of Sawyer’s standard. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada the Court
61. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
62. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 623 (citing In re Sawyer, 41 Haw. 403 (Haw.Terr.
1956)).
63. In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1958).
64. United States v. Fujimoto, 107 F. Supp. 865 (D.Haw. 1952). Petitioner
Sawyer was the attorney of record for defendants. One charge related to a speech
that petitioner gave about six weeks after the trial began regarding the presiding
judge’s lack of impartiality and fairness in conducting the trial. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at
624-25. The other charge dealt with Sawyer’s interview of a juror after the trial
ended with a guilty verdict. Id. at 648 (Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark, and Whittaker,
JJ., dissenting).
65. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 631, 635.
66. Id. at 646-47 (Stewart, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 640. The Supreme Court held that the trial record was insufficient
to support a finding that Sawyer’s out of court speech (at a meeting of the
International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, who happened to
also be her client) during the progress of the trial had impugned the presiding
judge’s integrity or impartiality. Id.
68. Justice Stewart expressed this underlying precept by stating that “[a]
lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and honor,
which experience has shown necessary for a calling dedicated to the
accomplishment of justice.” Id. at 646 (Stewart, J., concurring).
69. Lawyers are free to criticize the state of the law but with a limitation on a
lawyer’s First Amendment rights where there is an improper attack on the
administration of justice. Id. at 635.
70. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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was again called on to review another disciplinary proceeding
71
regarding attorney speech. Writing for the Court in Parts I and II,
the Chief Justice concluded that the “substantial likelihood of
material prejudice” test applied by Nevada satisfied the First
72
Amendment.
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, this test
strikes a balance between an attorney’s First Amendment right to
make statements regarding current litigation and the State’s
73
interest in fair trials. Thus, when the Chief Justice stated “this
Court’s decisions dealing with lawyer’s First Amendment
right[s] . . . have balanced the State’s interest in regulating a
specialized profession against a lawyer’s First Amendment interest
74
in the kind of speech at issue,” he was merely constricting the First
Amendment rights of attorneys.
Regardless of the Chief Justice’s language, the Court did hold
75
that Rule 177 was void for vagueness. Justice Kennedy, along with
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O’Connor, deemed the
76
safe-harbor language within Rule 177 to have misled Gentile into
believing he would not violate any ethical rules by holding a press
77
conference.
Consequently, the Court’s development of the concept of
78
79
academic freedom since Adler and through Gentile has generally
upheld an attorney’s First Amendment rights, and has only sought
to restrict those rights in the interest of justice. And more recently
80
the Court set forth a balancing test requiring state bar associations
to balance an attorney’s First Amendment rights with the interests
71. The Nevada Supreme Court found that Dominic Gentile violated Nevada
Supreme Court Rule 177 which prohibited an attorney from making extrajudicial
statements to the press that he knows or reasonably should know will have a
“substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.” Id. at
1075 (Rehnquist, C.J., Part III).
72. Id.
73. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist goes on to state that the “substantial
likelihood” test embodied in Rule 177 is constitutional under this analysis for it is
designed to protect the integrity and fairness of a State’s judicial system, and it
imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyer’s speech. Id.
74. Id. at 1073-76.
75. Id. at 1048.
76. Rule 177(3) provides that a lawyer “may state without elaboration . . . the
general nature of the . . . defense . . . notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2(a-f).” Id.
77. Id. The Court went on to state that “absent any clarifying interpretation
by the state court, the Rule fails to provide fair notice to those to whom it is
directed.” Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972)).
78. 342 U.S. 485, 510 (1951)(Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
79. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
80. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
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of the state during disciplinary actions concerning out-of-court
speech by an attorney. As such, it is apparent that the Court has
struck the appropriate symmetry between its desire to protect the
freedoms necessary for meaningful scholarship and the state’s right
to restrict those rights under certain circumstances.
2. Ethical Regulations to Academic Freedom
Additionally, a second challenge to the academic freedom
protections for legal academic scholarship is that the ethical
regulations typically invoked are subject-oriented regulations, not
81
content-oriented. In this author’s particular situation, censorship
was directed at non-confidential, generally known information,
which the author was exposed to during the course of
82
employment.
83
A broad reading of Ethical Code 4-5 would bar legal scholars
and legal academics from participating in public policy debates on
issues with which both, arguably, have knowledge and expertise.
An obvious conclusion is that EC 4-5 is a content-based regulation
based on the language that “authorities must . . . examine the
84
content of the message that is conveyed” in order to determine if
a violation of EC 4-5 occurred.
As applied to this author’s previous dilemma, the censorial
former employer proclaimed that “the client will be upset . . . no
85
matter what slant you put on it.” In effect, this meant the former
employer and its client wished to keep the specific legal issue below
the proverbial radar screen for as long as possible.Consequently,
one is able to easily discern that, although a lawyer’s freedom of
86
speech is not favored in all situations, in cases concerning
academic scholarship, whatever its source, the First Amendment
81. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1256.
82. The Model Rules permit a lawyer [and arguably legal scholar] to use
information relating to a former client that is in the “public domain.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.9(c)(1)(2001) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
PROF’L CONDUCT]. However, “a lawyer [legal scholar] should not use information
acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the
client.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1981) [hereinafter PROF’L
RESP.].
83. PROF’L RESP., supra note 82. Note that Minnesota replaced the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility with the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
84. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1983).
85. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 2.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 59-82.
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secures a lawyer, legal scholar or academician his or her academic
freedom rights.
III. ONE’S DUTY TO MAINTAIN CLIENT CONFIDENCES
“A lawyer [legal scholar] shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client unless the client consents after
87
88
The reference to this rule implied that
consultation[. . .]”
writing a paper, with a possibility of publication, would
89
inappropriately disclose client confidences and/or secrets.
The retort to this rationale is elementary. The previous paper
90
91
92
topic would not disclose any client confidences or secrets as
93
defined. Which, in turn, begs the question, how a court would
rule if a would-be officious intervenor invoked Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.6 and 1.9 to censor a proposed piece of
94
legal academic scholarship?
87. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.6(a) (emphasis added). The
comments explain further that “[t]he confidentiality rule applies not merely to
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source.” Id. at cmt. 6.
88. August 17 Letter, supra note 2.
89. Id. Again, The point must be stressed that since the former employer
chose to make vague references – arguably, an attempt to blur the specific charge
– the author has had to make assumptions as to the particular language and
charge leveled.
90. See supra note 1.
91. Client confidences are “information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law[.]” PROF’L RESP., supra note 82, at DR 4-101(A)
(emphasis added).
92. Secrets are “other information gained in the professional relationship
that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client.” Id. Note that the
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct “eliminate[d] the two-pronged duty under the
Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility in favor of a single standard protecting all
information about a client ‘relating to the representation.’” PROF’L CONDUCT,
supra note 82, at Model Code Comparison cmt. 1.
93. To provide the reader with a basis for this statement, I note that the initial
twelve pages of text to the first topic contained citations to the following: two
Federal statutes; three Arizona statutes; two California statutes; three Minnesota
statutes; one Arizona case; one California case; one Texas case; one Washington
case; as well as references to legal encyclopedias and legal dictionaries. The
former client is neither mentioned nor analogized to in the first paper. Aaron M.
Vande Linde, Interest Earned in Escrow Accounts: An Escrow Agent’s Profits or Not?
(Aug. 2001) (incomplete, unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
94. “I doubt that a physician who broadcast the confidential disclosures of his
patients could rely on the constitutional right of free speech to protect him from
professional discipline.” In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646 (1959)(Stewart, J.
concurring).
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Since the type of speech involved was political in nature, the
96
97
One
regulation may be challenged as vague and overbroad.
authority believes censorship of “all information relating to the
98
representation” is overbroad “absent any requirement that
99
disclosure of the information have an associated harm.”
Considering the previous paper topic contained no confidences or
secrets, why would the author’s former employer seek to censor the
research, writing and possible publication of a legal issue? Two
rationales are readily apparent.
A. Preservation of Client Confidences
1. Duty of Confidentiality
The preservation of client confidences is a real concern for
practitioners.
The duty of confidentiality is grounded in
100
evidentiary law’s attorney-client privilege. This privilege arose in
the seventeenth century as an outgrowth of the general principle
101
that to reveal another’s confidences was dishonorable.
Later in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the reasoning shifted to
the proper functioning of the legal system as a whole. The
attorney-client privilege, in its traditional form, holds that:
(1) where legal advise of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his/her capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his/her instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by him/herself or by the legal adviser, (8)

95. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1260-61 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
432 (1963)).
96. The vagueness doctrine originated in the 14th Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and is a basis for striking down legislation
containing insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful. Connally v. Gen.
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)(stating that a law is unconstitutionally vague
when people “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning”).
97. The overbreadth doctrine serves to invalidate legislation, which regulates
more speech than the Constitution allows to be regulated. Schad v. Borough of
Mt. Emphraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (stating that a law whose aim was to prohibit
nude dancing, but actually prohibited all live entertainment, was overbroad).
98. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at cmt. 6.
99. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1261.
100. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY – ETHICS BY THE
PERVASIVE METHOD 223 (2d ed. 1998).
101. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-62 (1978).
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102

except [if] the protection be waived.

2. Preservation of Individual Rights
A second justification for confidentiality is that an overarching
objective of our legal system is the preservation of individual rights.
Our legal system requires its participants to seek attorney assistance
so as to protect a client’s legal interests. It is a self-evident truth
that unless clients feel free to provide all relevant information an
103
attorney cannot provide adequate representation for the client.
An assurance of confidentiality seemingly injects trust into the
attorney client relationship. This trust allows a client to openly
consult with an attorney and disclose key facts, which could be
legally helpful to the client. Thus, without a duty of confidentiality
enmeshed in our legal system, a client likely would be overly
cautious in revealing information, which would in turn deprive a
104
client from the effective assistance of counsel.
Likewise, a duty of confidentiality allows clients facing criminal
prosecution to fully exercise their Sixth Amendment right to
105
counsel
and their Fifth Amendment privilege against self106
Whereupon an attorney could be compelled to
incrimination.
reveal confidential information, a client’s reliance on one
constitutional guarantee effectively would compromise the other
107
guarantee.
Nonetheless, the broad scope of our current confidentiality
rules does have its critics. One such critique asserts that the
elementary priorities found in the traditional confidentiality
rationale are “perverse” because those priorities favor clients who
withhold information out of irresponsible motives at the expense of
108
innocent third parties.
Moreover, riddled throughout the

102. John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple
Clients, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 784 (1992); John P. Frowe, The Legal Ethics of Louis
Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702 (1965).
103. HAZARD, supra note 101, at 69.
104. State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 1967) (defining effective
assistance of counsel as “conscientious, meaningful representation wherein
accused is advised of his rights and honest, learned and able counsel is given a
reasonable opportunity to perform the task assigned”).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
106. Id. at amend. V.
107. RHODE, supra note 100, at 226.
108. Id. at 227 (citing Klemm v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512
(1977)).
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115
110

current Code
are numerous exceptions to confidentiality,
which erode the duty to maintain confidences. Hence a review of
the common law rationale of confidentiality is needed.
3. Two common law rules of confidentiality
111

Turning to the law of agency the most applicable rule states:
[u]nless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency
the agent: . . . (b) has a duty to the principal not to use or disclose
to third persons trade secrets, . . . or other similar confidential
matters given to him only for the principal’s use[.] The agent is
entitled to use general information concerning the . . . business of the
112
principal . . . if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent[.]
113
An argument for censorship based upon this provision is
unpersuasive, however, for three reasons.
First, section 396(b)’s language limits its application to “trade
114
secrets . . . or other similar confidential matters” and does not
115
include non-confidential, non-secret, public-domain information.
Second, section 396(b) contains a specific entitlement for the
former agent to use “general information concerning the method
116
of business of the principal.” Third, an agent’s obligation under
section 396 “is directed to ‘commercial activity and competition
117
between rival businesses,’” and not to the type of public policy debate
involved in a law review article.
118
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provides
109.
110.

PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82.
Id. at 1.6(a), 1.6(b)(1)(2), 1.9(c)(1); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 495-96 (2d ed. 1995).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957).
112. Id. at § 396 (emphasis added).
113. Note, this argument was not made in the August 17 Letter; its inclusion in
this paper is to fully analyze the duty of confidentiality from numerous
perspectives.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: USING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
AFTER TERMINATION OF AGENCY § 396(b)(1957).
115. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: USING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
AFTER TERMINATION OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1957).
117. Penguin Books USA, Inc. v. Walsh, 756 F. Supp. 770, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(rejecting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b) and (c) as grounds for
censoring book on the Iran-Contra Affair by former associate counsel with Office
of Independent Counsel), appeal dismissed, vacating as moot and remanding with
direction to dismiss, 929 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1991).
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). Unlike
the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of
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specific guidance for the legal community regarding
confidentiality. Section 60 proposes a general duty to safeguard
client confidences in that “during and after representation of a
client: (a) the lawyer may not use or disclose confidential client
information . . . if there is a reasonable prospect that doing so will
119
adversely affect a material interest of the client . . . .”
Client information is confidential when it consists of
information regarding a client or the client’s matter contained in
documents, or other communiqués, “other than information that is
120
generally known.”
The initial drafters provided further
clarification of the duty of confidentiality in the official comments
121
to sections 111 and 112. The comments give further guidance on
122
when information becomes “generally known.”
And the
comments give special treatment to “generally known information
123
about the law that a lawyer derives from representing clients.” It
follows, consequently, that what a lawyer acquires into his or her
legal knowledge base through experience, research, scholarship
and the like becomes the lawyer’s to “employ for the benefit of all
124
clients, for law reform efforts, or for the lawyer’s personal use”
such as writing.

Professional Responsibility, the Restatement is not a set of regulations. Rather, the
Restatement is a series of principles (or “black letter rules”) going beyond the
ethics rules to cover other areas affecting the practice of law (e.g., vicarious
liability, tort doctrines relating to malpractice, and attorney-client evidentiary
privilege).
119. Id. at § 60.
120. Id. at § 59 (emphasis added).
121. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 111, 112 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 1988). The definition of confidential client information includes
information and communications that were not strictly private in nature when the
lawyer first received them. It also may apply to information that originates in strict
secrecy but then becomes known by others . . . so long as the information does not
become generally known.” Id. (emphasis added)
122. Id. at cmt. e. The American Law Institute designated information as
generally known “when the information is so public that a person interested in
knowing the information could obtain it . . . without special knowledge or
substantial difficulty or expense.” Id.
123. Id. at cmt. f. This comment excludes from the definition of confidential
client information generally known information about the law that a lawyer, or
legal scholar, derives from representing clients. It further states that “[s]uch
information becomes part of the general set of skills and fund of information
possessed by the lawyer . . . Unlike other kinds of generally known information . . .
information about the law is to be considered generally known. . .” Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at cmt. f.
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B. Contrasting the need for a free flow of information
A direct consequence of the first rationale favoring censorship
is practitioners would not seek a free flow of information and
would not carefully parse a piece of legislation to provide for such a
free flow of information. “Practitioners [thus] tend to ignore the
precise rules in this area, and opt for secrecy if there is any issue of
125
On the other hand, legal academics desire the
confidentiality.”
freest exchange of information, and delve deep for substantive
direction from the guiding principles as to what is and is not
126
permissible.
While a legal scholar may be immune to the
practitioner’s concerns for commercial gain, the scholar does have
a critical stake in the freest exchange of information, and thus will
focus earnestly on the particular rules to determine whether or not
the rules permit disclosure.
127
The vague reference to the Rules of Professional Conduct
indicates a lack of concern with whether or not the referenced rule
actually prohibited this author’s actions. Was it thought that
leveling an ethical violation against a legal scholar would be
dispositive without further debate?
The author could only
speculate and refuses to do so here. Considering the former
employer claimed confidential status of the information, though it
has been shown to be otherwise, i.e. information in the public
128
domain, the rules would permit disclosure.
IV. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION DETRIMENTAL TO A FORMER
CLIENT
“A lawyer [legal scholar] . . . whose present or former firm has
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1)
use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage
129
“You learned about the San Francisco
of the former client[.]”
case . . . while doing research for a client . . . ; a law review article

125. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1261.
126. Upon receiving the August 17 Letter, the author immediately consulted
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and within three to four days amassed
numerous decisions and articles regarding the issues presented in the August 17
Letter.
127. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1; PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at
1.6.
128. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9(c)(1).
129. Id.
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on the topic is likely to have an adverse effect on the client. . .”
The response to this line of reasoning is three-fold.
A. Generally Known Information
131

First, the rationale that Rule 1.9 requires silence of any
information damaging to the former client is simply wrong. A
plain reading of the Rule distinctly permits disclosure of generally
132
known information.
A prerequisite, when analyzing Rule
1.9(c)(1) must be to establish what the drafters meant by the term
of art “generally known.” The sole guidance given by the drafters is
133
analogous to information found in the “public domain.” Delving
further, an organic meaning of public domain is found in the
tenets of copyright law, setting forth public ownership status of
134
writings, publications and the like not protected by copyrights.
135
Likewise, the “fair use” doctrine establishes that scholarship and
research is not an infringement of a valid copyright. “Generally
136
known,” as stated in the Code, thus encompasses information
devoid of copyright protection found in the public sphere.
Turning to the issue presented, the first paper’s topic and

130. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1.
131. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9(c)(1).
132. Id. (stating “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client . . . shall not
thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation . . . except . . . when the
information has become generally known. . .” (emphasis added)). See also discussion
supra Part III.A and text accompanying notes 107-114.
133. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9(c)(1) Model Code Comparison
cmt. 3 (stating, “it is a necessity to define when a lawyer may make use fo
information about a client after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated”).
While there was no termination of the client-lawyer relationship, there was a
termination of an employment relationship—the author resigned his position to
accept other employment. Thus, because of a termination of the employment
relationship and even though the author’s position was that of a law clerk, the
client-lawyer relationship ended with regards to the author’s involvement with his
former employer’s client.
134. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1976); see generally EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S.
PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 396-98 (discussing the
nature of ownership rights to published works under copyright law).
135. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1976). This doctrine balances the author’s traditional
ownership rights with First Amendment values allowing for criticism and
comment, and scholarly use. To balance these equities, one must look to the
following:
(1) purpose and character of use (i.e. is the use commercial or educational in
nature?); (2) nature of copyrighted work; (3) amount and substantiality of portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) effect of the use. Id.
136. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9(c)(1).
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137

information became generally known prior to the initial research
138
and formulation of a position on the legal issue. Moreover, even
if copyright law deemed the information protected, research and
scholarly comment of the information would not infringe the
139
copyright. Hence, no duty to maintain confidences so as to avoid
detriment to the former client existed upon mental conception of
the first topic. The rationale is, arguably, once confidential
information becomes public, no disclosure of confidential
information by an attorney could cause a detriment because any
detriment occurred when the information became public
140
knowledge.
The duty to maintain potentially detrimental
confidences should have no application if the information is
141
generally known. Therefore, the expansionist reading of Rule
1.9(c)(1) is not a reasonable reading, and is not supported in the
142
field of legal ethics.
B. Information as Property
Second, censorship would be improper based on a client
claiming information as property. The former employer asserted
that learning of a legal issue while doing research for the client
supports the notion that the client holds a property interest in the
137. See supra text accompanying note 1.
138. Old Republic Title Must Pay $17 Million to Customers, L.A. TIMES, May 12,
2001, at C2; Jim Herron Zamora, Old Republic Fined Additional $15 million / Title
company to Pay Damages in Fraud Case, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 12, 2001, at C2.
See generally Robert C. Farrell, Limited Practice Officers and Admission to Practice Rule
12: Taking or Not?, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 735 (2000) (discussing typical escrow
transactions and Washington’s treatment of limited practice officers with regards
to escrow transactions); John C. Murray, Insured Closings: Title Company Agents and
Approved Attorneys, 456 P.L.I. REAL ESTATE 1161, 1173-75 (2000) (discussing the
information borrowers and lenders need to know in today’s market); Michael C.
Patton & Robert W. Sargeant, Recent Developments in Title Insurance Law, 35 TORT &
INS. L.J. 639, 647-50 (1999)(discussing court treatment of agent malfeasance in the
title insurance context).
139. See supra note 134.
140. Cf. L. RAY PATTERSON, LAWYER’S LAW: PROCEDURAL, MALPRACTICE AND
DISCIPLINARY ISSUES 129-32 (4th ed. 1998).
141. Preventing a legal scholar from using public domain information in legal
academic scholarship to which he or she was exposed during the course of private
employment. See August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1.
142. See generally OLAVI MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS ¶
1536 (1970) (N.J. 49 (Op. 50)) (differentiating between an attorney who discloses
“information which is a matter of public record” to a research firm compiling
information, and “confidential information” which an attorney may reveal only
with client permission).
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143

knowledge gained.
This extraordinary position is specious at
best, and is in direct conflict with the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.
144
Similarly, Canon 8 provided that “[a] lawyer should assist in
145
This statement is premised on the
improving the legal system.”
fact that “lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant
146
contributions to the improvement of the legal system.”
Additionally, the commentary asserts that
[b]y reason of education and experience, lawyers are especially
qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to
initiate corrective measures therein. Thus they [lawyers] should
participate in proposing and supporting legislation and programs
to improve the system, without regard to the general interests or desires of
147
clients or former clients.
The essence of this issue then is whether the experience
gained by the attorney becomes the property of the client or the
property of the attorney. A straightforward and definitive answer is
found in Canon 8; an attorney’s experiences are not a former
148
client’s property.
In fact, legal scholars and attorneys also have
an ethical obligation to society at large to research and comment
149
via legal academic scholarship for changes in the law.
Likewise, the former employer’s proposed position of
150
An attorney or
censorship cuts against the grain of Canon 7.
legal scholar’s loyalty obligation to a former client “implies no
obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the interests
or desires of [the] client. . . . [an attorney or legal scholar] may take
positions on public issues and espouse legal reforms . . . without regard to
151
the individual view of any client.”
143. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1. Effectively, the former employer, on
behalf of its client, claimed a property interest in a legal issue presented to a
California court. See supra note 1.
144. PROF’L RESP., supra note 82. Please note that the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility retains only persuasive weight with respect to the
author’s situation due to Minnesota’s enactment of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.
145. Id.
146. Id. at EC 8-8.
147. Id. at EC 8-1 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at Canon 8.
149. Id. at EC 8-2 (providing that “[i]f a lawyer believes that the . . . absence of
a rule of law . . . contributes to an unjust result, he [or she] should endeavor by
lawful means to obtain appropriate changes in the law”).
150. See id. at Canon 7.
151. Id. at EC 7-17 (emphasis added).
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C. Treatment within Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers
The Restatement addresses the issues of whether a lawyer, or
legal scholar, can take a position on a public policy question
152
“A lawyer may publicly take personal
adverse to a former client.
positions on controversial issues without regard to whether the
positions are consistent with those of some or all of the lawyer’s
clients[.]” The public policy discussion of the proposed topic,
which was the target of the former employer’s censorship, is clearly
153
applicable in this instance.
The idiosyncrasies in approach, the practitioners’client-centric
focus and the academicians’public policy-centered focus, are
clearly demonstrated in the Restatement discussion above.
Focusing on client representation and starting with the opinion
that maintaining client secret’s is the primary goal, “it is easy to
assume that there should be a common law duty not to use any
information from a representation, even non-confidential, public
154
domain information, to the detriment of [a] client.”
In the
alternative, by focusing on public policy debates the “nonconfidential, public domain character of information becomes
dispositive, not the fact that the lawyer was serving a client when
155
Consequently, a legal scholar
exposed to the information.”
retains any experience gained during the course of employment as
his or her personal property, and is free to research, analyze, and
advocate for changes in the law without any apprehension of
violating the ethical considerations of the legal profession.
V. CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSE CONSIDERED, BUT DISMISSED
While it has already been established that no confidential duty
156
existed as to the information to be used, It is still necessary to
refute the final argument in favor of censorship. That argument
152. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: LAWYER OPENLY EXPRESSING
PUBLIC POLICY VIEWS INCONSISTENT WITH CLIENT POSITIONS § 114 (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 1988).
153. Once again, I stress that the proposed topic was not only addressing a
novel issue in the law; it was to afford a legal scholar with an opportunity to engage
in an in-depth analysis of the issue and propose a framework for analysis should
the issue present itself to a Minnesota court.
154. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1292.
155. Id. at 1293.
156. The information has been shown to be “generally known information”
and information within the “public domain” and as such, no confidential duty
exists. See supra Parts III., IV.
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being – “you must keep the information that you learned as an
157
employee of the firm confidential.”
A. Confidentiality Clause
“As a result of . . . employment . . . you will . . . have access to
confidential information . . . . As a condition of employment, you
must agree that . . . you will not at any time divulge or disclose . . .
any such information, whether or not it has been designated
158
This is
specifically as ‘confidential’ or ‘attorney work product.’”
the language the former employer now relies upon to censor a
proposed law review paper. In order to determine the effectiveness
of the clause, it is necessary to parse its language and analyze it
against the backdrop of current Minnesota case law.
First, the language of the former employer’s confidentiality
clause signifies the boundaries of the confidential duty imposed
upon its employees. The clause begins by presenting an employee
with an ambiguous definition of what the firm considers to be
159
confidential, and conditions employment on the employee’s
agreement not to divulge or disclose such information. The
confidentiality clause goes on to incorporate Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.6 into the agreement, and requires an
160
employee’s strict adherence to Rule 1.6. The clause does not set
forth any duty to maintain client confidences after termination or
resignation. The clause’s language - “[a]s a condition of your
employment,” “except in the responsible exercise of your job,” and
“[a]ll employees” – establishes that the confidential duty only
applies to its then current employees. The purview of the clause
itself thus has no binding effect on an employee who has resigned
his/her post at the firm.
The drafters signaled their resolve that employees maintain
confidences by including the confidentiality requirements of Rule
1.6 on its employees and calling for strict adherence to that Rule.
157. August 17 Letter, supra note 2.
158. Confidentiality Clause, supra note 8.
159. The Confidentiality Clause provides its definition of confidential
information by way of a seemingly non-exhaustive list of confidential matters. Id.
160. Id. Rule 1.6 “Confidentiality of Information” mandates that an attorney
shall not reveal confidential client information unless the client consents after
consultation, or the attorney has a reasonable belief that revealing such
information will prevent bodily harm, or the attorney reasonably believes is
necessary to establish a claim or defense in an action between the attorney and
client. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.6.
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However, the drafters failed to utilize language that extends the
confidential duty to former employees. Only the language of the
clause itself can show the drafters’ intent, and this language fails to
161
continue the duty found in Rule 1.9. Without direct evidence of
the drafters’ intent to extend the confidential duty, one cannot
surmise the drafters meant to charge former employees with an
extended duty of confidentiality.
Moreover, the grammatical structure of the clause negates a
finding that the language “you will not at any time divulge or
162
disclose”
prolongs a former employee’s duty to maintain
confidences. Because the language is framed in the terms “[a]s a
condition of employment,” the clause limits itself to the duration of
an employee’s stint with a firm. One might protest that this is
solely a semantic exercise, allowing the author another avenue to
breach one of the sacred tenets—duty of confidentiality—of the
legal profession. However, the lessons of statutory construction
mandate every word has meaning within the statute and no word is
163
superfluous. Accordingly, the intent of the confidentiality clause
must be determined by the plain language of the clause and within
the bounds of its grammatical structure; construing the clause any
other way demonstrates a general lack of understanding in contract
interpretation.
B. Minnesota Case Law Applied to a Hypothetical Situation
Turning now to a hypothetical situation: if the proposed paper
164
had actually been written, could the former employer rely on its
confidentiality clause to censor the proposed paper topic?
Minnesota courts carefully scrutinize restrictive covenants
when determining enforceability because the covenants limit an
employee’s ability to work and earn a living. As such, restrictive
161. This position assumes that once an employee resigns his/her position
with a firm, the firm’s clients become the former employee’s former clients.
PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9. Even though the former employee was not
in fact an attorney, the former employee possesses the confidential client
information intimated to in Rule 1.9. Thus one is able to conclude that the duty
to avoid conflicts with former clients extends to a firm’s former employees.
162. Confidentiality Clause, supra note 8.
163. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) (stating that a word
“gathers meaning from the words around it”). See also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (arguing against the use
of legislative history as an interpretive tool).
164. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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covenants are generally looked upon with disfavor.
Minnesota
courts have further held that a restrictive covenant “must not
impose any greater restriction on the employee than is necessary to
166 167
protect the employer’s business.”
As applied to this author’s
previous situation, the following queries need be resolved.
First, did the confidentiality clause impair the author’s ability
to work in the legal field and earn a living? At first glance, the
answer is no. The author was engaged in writing and research to
fulfill a law review requirement, and by itself this would not appear
to limit one’s earning potential. Despite the initial appearance,
one can argue that indeed the author’s ability to work and earn
income was impaired. On account of the former employer’s
censorial position, the author had reason to cease work on the
initial paper, ascertain whether or not the censorial position had
merit, and act accordingly. To do so required the author’s time,
and thus diverted the author’s attention from new job
responsibilities as well as detracting from the author’s adequate
class preparation. Reducing the amount of time the author could
spend on class preparation clearly will have a correlation to an
ability to earn an income as an attorney; without above average
grades a law school graduate is behind the proverbial eight ball in
the job market.
Second, does the confidentiality clause impose a greater
restriction than is necessary to protect the employer’s business?
That is, is the clause reasonable? In analyzing the confidentiality
clause’s reasonableness, the court would consider the nature and
character of the employment, nature and extent of the business,
the time frame in which the restriction is imposed, and balance
should be struck between the interests of the employer and the
168
employee.
It is easily shown that the clause is for the protection of client
confidences and general firm information, arguably a reasonable
goal. Regardless, as previously explained, the clause’s reach does
169
not extend to former employees.
If a reviewing court were not
initially to find the truth in the previous sentence, it would need to
165. E.g., Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn.
1965).
166. Id. at 899. In like manner, the Minnesota courts validate restrictive
covenants when it is necessary to protect the employer’s business. Id.
167. Id.
168. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
169. See supra Part V.A.
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toil in its determination of reasonableness. The nature and
character of employment and nature of business are directly
170
correlative, and should not be thought of as two distinct areas.
The clause contains no time limitation for maintaining confidential
171
In order to strike a balance between these two
information.
competing forces, a court may necessarily have to “blue pencil a
covenant, that is, to modify so as to render it reasonable and
172
enforceable.”
To do so the court would have to engage in
judicial paternalism, which courts typically are not inclined to do.
Nonetheless, a reasonable solution could have been reached by
allowing the former employee, your author, to write a paper on the
proposed topic with the understanding that the paper need be
devoid of any confidential information.
In spite of the
aforementioned reasonable solution, no charge was brought to
enforce the confidentiality clause and the only solution proposed
was that your author substitute the first topic with another.
VI. CONCLUSION
The vague reasoning in favor of censorship set forth by the
former employer was insufficient. The argument calling for the
author to uphold his duty to maintain client confidences and
secrets has been shown to have no application to information that
has become generally known.
Moreover, its own language
173
disproved the specific rule cited by the former employer.
Secondly, the detriment to the former client argument also fell
victim to its own language, and appears to be flatly contrary to
established authority. Lastly, the confidentiality agreement was
shown to have no application by the very nature of the instrument
itself. Yet it is somehow a scant outcome by honestly establishing
that the arguments for censorship are vacuous and unconvincing.
What remains galling is that the issue would even arise in the first
place. Regardless of the fallacies shown in the censors position, the
author decided to shift long paper topics based on the Golden

170. The nature and character of the employment was legal research and
writing; the firm utilized this research and writing to provide clients with
memorandum of law addressing novel legal areas.
171. Confidentiality Clause, supra note 8.
172. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 800 (citing Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791,
794-95 (Minn. 1977)).
173. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at 1.7.
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Rule—do unto others as you would have them do onto you.
Long ago, one academic rejoiced and celebrated in the
thought that the “principle of fear has been almost wholly banished
from systems of education” as well as learning had become
175
recognized “as an independent interest of the community.” And
today the principle that “the scholar is especially encouraged to
176
participate in the public forum” should once again ring true.

174. “In everything, therefore, treat people the same way you want them to
treat you, for this is the Law and the Prophets.” Matthew 7:12 (NEW AMERICAN
STANDARD BIBLE 2000).
175. 2 JOSIAH QUINCY, THE HISTORY OF HARVARD 445-46 (1977). Quincy went
on to conclude by asserting that attempts were being made “to rescue the general
mind from the vassalage in which it has been held by sects of the church, and by
parties in the state; giving to that interest . . . a vitality of its own, having no
precarious dependence . . . on subserviency to particular views[.]” Id.
176. Borris I. Bittker, Developments in the Law – Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1045, 1048 (1968).
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